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Dow, James, Board Incentives and CEO Turnover (March 16, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024994
Abstract:
This paper shows that corporate boards will be reluctant to replace CEOs because firing sends a negative signal to the market and makes financing more expensive. This entrenchment result differs from existing literature because entrenchment is not a consequence of the CEO's own power, nor from collusion between board and CEO. Entrenchment is mitigated, but not eliminated, when the firm has more assets in place relative to investment opportunities. The paper also compares public (listed) and private equity ownership. Private ownership eliminates the costs of CEO entrenchment, but a stock market listing adds to firm value because the share price can guide investment decisions. I show that established firms with substantial existing assets compared to their investment opportunities will choose publicly listed status, while more rapidly growing firms will choose private ownership.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, Public versus Private Ownership